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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***RM
Date: 3/13/2018 5:42 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk
IN THE SUPERIOR COUR T OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

DRUMMOND FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC; et
al.,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No.
2014CV253677

)
V.

)

TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC.; et al.,

)
)

Bus. Case Div. 4

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS AND REQUESTS
The above styled action is before the Court on various pending motions and requests, to wit:
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (collectively "Motion to
Dismiss"); (2) Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's1 Motion to Add Parties and for Related Relief
("Motion to Add Parties"); (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counts II and lII of Defendants' Amended
Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of Defendants'
Second Amended Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim (collectively "Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaim"); (4) various discovery related motions and issues, including Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
and Defendants' Motion to Compel; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement of Paragraphs l(a) and l(b)
of the Interlocutory Injunction; and (6) Plaintiffs' Motion for Separate Trial on Defendants' Permissive
Counterclaims. Having considered the record, the Court finds and orders as follows:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case concerns a dispute between businesses which compete in the title loan industry.
Plaintiffs' are companies affiliated by a common ownership and control engaged in the business of

Hereinafter TitleMax Georgia.
Plaintiffs include Drummond Financial Services, LLC; Anderson Financial Services, LLC; LoanSmart,
LLC; Kipling Financial Services, LLC; Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; LoanMax, LLC; Mid-American Title Loans,
LLC; Fairfax Financial Services, LLC; Wellshire Financial Services, LLC; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc.;

making loans to consum ers secured by motor vehicles (i.e. "title loans") and consists of loan brokers and

direct lenders. Plaintiffs Drummond Financial Services, Inc. and LoanSta? act as loan brokers in that
they assist customers seeking to obtain title loans from third-party lenders. The remaining Plaintiffs are
direct lenders who specialize in making title loans directly to consumers. Plaintiffs assert they invest
significant time and resources in developing customer relationships to help ensure customers return for
future loans.
The various TitleMax Defendants" are part of a conglomerate of related companies also engaged
in the title loan business, including brokers and direct lenders. Defendants are direct competitors of
Plaintiffs and operate stores across the United States.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have committed a variety of tortious acts while engaged in a
nationwide campaign to systematically steal their customers. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Defendants:
(1) improperly accessed Department of Motor Vehicle ("OMV") records in violation of federal and state

laws to obtain information regarding Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers and then used that
information to solicit and divert Plaintiffs' customers to the Defendants; (2) improperly entered Plaintiffs'
premises in order to solicit Plaintiffs' customers; and (3) offered Plaintiffs' employees monetary
compensation for diverting Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers away from Plaintiffs to
Defendants. Plaintiffs have asserted six claims against the Defendants including misappropriation of trade
secrets, unfair competition, two counts of tortious interference with prospective contracts and business
relationships, trespass and civil conspiracy.
TitleMax Georgia has asserted a counterclaim against North American Title Loans, LLC, a
Georgia limited liability company and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc., alleging they are continuously
Meadowwood Financial Services, LLC; Select Management Funding, LLC; and various North American Title
Loans, LLC entities registered in Georgia, South Carolina, New Mexico and Utah. Plaintiffs are referred to
collectively herein as "Plaintiffs" or "Drummond".
3
"LoanStar" collectively refers to Plaintiffs Wellshire Financial Services LLC and Meadowwood Financial
Services, LLC.
4
Defendant TitleMax ("TMX") Finance Holdings, Inc. is the parent company that owns all ownership and
membership interest in Defendant TMX Finance, Inc. Defendant TMX Finance, Inc. is the parent company that
owns all ownership and membership interests of all the TMX subsidiaries, including Defendants TMX Ohio, TMX
Texas, TMX Virginia, TMX Utah, TMX Alabama, TMX New Mexico, TMX Arizona, TMX Missouri, TMX South
Carolina, and TMX Georgia. Defendants are referred to collectively herein as "Defendants" or TitleMax.
2

violating the Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §44-12-130 et seq., through their use of the term "loan" in

their names and advertising. TitleMax Georgia has asserted claims against those entities alleging:
( l) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; (2) unfair competition in violation of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (3) civil conspiracy.
Additionally, certain TitleMax Claimants have asserted a counterclaim alleging certain
Drummond parties' are instructing employees to visit TitleMax stores to falsely claim to be customers
looking for a title loan or posing as a potential recovery vendor, who then allegedly lie about needing to
use the restroom in order to gain access to restricted, non-public areas of TitleMax's stores in order to
photograph its trade secret financial information (contained on "goal boards"), information which is then
allegedly shared throughout Drummond's corporate structure. Based on the foregoing, the TitleMax
Claimants have brought claims alleging: ( l) trespass; (2) misappropriation and theft of trade secrets;
(3) violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; (4) conversion (in the
alternative); (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) entitlement to litigation expenses.
ANALYSIS
I.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' Count I (misappropriation of
trade secrets), Count II (unfair competition), Count III (tortious interference with Drummond's
prospective CSO contracts and business relationships), and Count IV (tortious interference with the Direct
Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships) under O.C.G.A. §9-11-12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. Defendants also request dismissal of Count II (unfair competition), Count III
(tortious interference with Drummond's prospective CSO contracts and business relationships), Count IV
(tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships),
Count V (trespass), Count VI (civil conspiracy), and Count IX (temporary restraining order and
permanent injunction), asserting those counts are "preempted, displaced, or superseded in whole or in part
by Count I."
See note 32, infra.
3

A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless:
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant
would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in
support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not
possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient
to warrant a grant of the relief sought.... In deciding a motion to dismiss, all
pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and
all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's
favor.
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga.
498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308,309, 800 S.E.2d 366,368 (2017),
reconsideration denied (June 5, 2017).
Under the notice pleading procedure of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, only a short and plain
statement of the claim is required. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(A). Nevertheless, "a complaint must give a
defendant notice of the claim in terms sufficiently clear to enable him to frame a responsive pleading
thereto." Patrick v. Verizon Directories Corp .. 284 Ga. App. 123, 124 (2007) (quoting Allen v. Bergman,
201 Ga. App. 781, 783(3)(b)(1991)).6
B. Whether Plaintiffs state actionable claims with respect to Counts I-IV
To assess whether Plaintiffs have properly stated claims under Counts I through IV, the Court
must first determine what substantive law governs and then considers whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently
stated a claim under the applicable law.
(1) Misappropriation of trade secrets (Count/)

Plaintiffs assert their "customer lists and related title loan information" constitute trade secrets
which Defendants have "acquired or discovered ... by improper and unlawful means."? Specifically, they

6

With respect to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the Court has limited its review to the pleadings. See
Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382, 384 n. 2, 790 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2016) ("Documents attached to a brief in
support of [a] motion to dismiss ... cannot be considered in deciding the motion to dismiss") (citation and
punctuation omitted).
7
First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief ("FAC"), ml l 00-101.
4

allege Defendants "performed unlawful and impermissible searches" in order to access drivers' personal
information from DMV records "in order to target Plaintiffs' customers for direct contact and
solicitation. "8
Plaintiffs contend Defendants' conduct violates the trade secret laws of "various States, including
but not limited to the States of Alabama (Ala Code §8-27-1, et seq.), Utah (Utah Code §13-24-1, et seq.),
Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code§ 133.61, et seq.), Missouri (Mo. Stat. §417.450 et seq.), Virginia (Va. Code §59.1336, et seq.), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. §57-3A-l), Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §44-401, et seq.), Tennessee
(Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-1701, et seq.), Texas (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §1345A.001, et seq.),
South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §39-8-10, et seq.), and Georgia (O.C.G.A. §10-1-760, et seq.y?"
However, Plaintiffs only specifically name Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and New Mexico as maintaining
databases with DMV records which can be sold to certain entities and then resold under limited
circumstances.l" Insofar as Plaintiffs are not asserting a misappropriation claim with respect to
Defendants' alleged conduct in Texas or South Carolina, as that conduct is the subject of separate
1

litigation/ the Court largely limits it analysis below regarding Plaintiffs' trade secret claims to laws of
Georgia (to the extent Defendants allege Georgia law governs), Ohio and New Mexico.

a.

Georgia law and conflict of laws analysis

Plaintiffs fail to state a trade secret claim under Georgia law. To "recover" under the Georgia
Trade Secrets Act ("TSA"), O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 et seq., a plaintiff must show that it has a trade secret
as defined by O.C.G.A. §10-1-761(4) and that the defendant misappropriated it. Contract Furniture
Refinishing & Maint. Corp. of Georgia v. Remanufacturing & Design Grp., LLC, 317 Ga. App. 47, 57,
730 S.E.2d 708, 715 (2012) (citing Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Atlanta v. Holley. 284 Ga. App. 591,
597(4), 644 S.E.2d 862, 867 (2007)). See O.C.G.A. §10-1-761.

8

12

See also EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue

FAC, ,1101.
FAC, ,1107.
10
FAC, ,168.
II
FAC, p. 30 n. 2.
12
The New Mexico TSA and Ohio TSA, both of which are also modeled after the Uniform Trade Secret Act,
are substantially similar. See generally N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 57-3A-2; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 1333.61.
9

5

Corp., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 2014) ("The plaintiff has the burden of establishing each of
these statutory elements as to each claimed trade secret. This means that a plaintiff who seeks relief for
misappropriation of trade secrets must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing that they
exist").The Georgia TSA defines a "trade secret" as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but
not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a
compilation, a program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a
process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual
or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or
available to the public and which information: (A) Derives economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (B) Is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
O.C.G.A. § I 0-1-761 (4).
However, "[u]nder O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4), only tangible lists of customers and suppliers are
the property of the [company] and warrant protection as trade secrets." DeGiorgio v. Megabyte Int'l, Inc.,
266 Ga. 539,539,468 S.E.2d 367,369 (1996) (citing Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 263 Ga. 615, 61820(2), 437 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1993)). See also Bacon v. Volvo Serv. Ctr., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 543,545,597
S.E.2d 440, 443 (2004) (citing Crews v. Roger Wahl, C.P.A., P.C., 238 Ga. App. 892, 898, n. 4, 520
S.E.2d 727 (1999) ("While a client list may be subject to confidential treatment under the Georgia [TSA],
the information itself is not inherently confidential. Customers are not trade secrets. Confidentiality is
afforded only where the customer list is not generally known or ascertainable from other sources and was
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy"). Here, insofar as Plaintiffs do not allege that
Defendants took a tangible list of their customers, but rather contend Defendants searched motor vehicle
databases to determine, inter alia, which vehicles have liens held by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have not stated a
claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under Georgia law. 13

13

See also TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 838, 797 S.E.2d 842, 845

(2017).
6

Defendants argue that, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti, Georgia law governs Plaintiffs'

misappropriation claim related to Defendants' access and use of OMV records in Ohio and New Mexico.
Defendants contend that since the last event to trigger liability under the Georgia TSA is where Plaintiffs
sustained their injury and, here, Plaintiffs' economic losses were ultimately suffered in Georgia where
their principal places of business are located, it follows that Georgia law applies such that Plaintiffs fail to
state a trade secrets claim regarding Defendants' alleged out-of-state conduct. The Court disagrees.
Under Georgia law, the lex loci delicti determines the substantive rights
of the parties. Ohio Southern Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga. App. 867,
868(1), 140 S.E.2d 235. How do we determine the lex loci delicti where
the tort is transitory in nature? The general rule is that "the place of
wrong, the locus delicti, is the place where the injury sustained was
suffered rather than the place where the act was committed, or, as it is
sometimes more generally put, it is the place where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." 15A
C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, § 12(2)(b), 459. Georgia follows the general
rule: In Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga. App. 378, 210
S.E.2d 854, we observed that " 'The law of the place where the tort or
wrong has been committed is the law by which the liability is to be
determined, and the place of the wrong is the place where ... there takes
place the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort.'
" Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., supra, at p. 380, 210 S.E.2d
854, quoting Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, 253 F.Supp. 119, 121
(N.D.Ga.1966).
Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903-04, 324 S.E.2d 738, 740
(1984). See Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 750, 740 S.E.2d 622,625 (2013).
As noted above, to state a claim under the Georgia TSA (as well as under the New Mexico TSA
and Ohio TSA), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the information in question constitutes a "trade secret"
and that the defendant misappropriated it. Notably, however, a plaintiff need not show damages or
economic injury in order to obtain relief under the Georgia TSA. Indeed, the Act expressly authorizes
injunctive relief and permits damages "[i]n addition to or in lieu of' such injunctive relief and "if neither
damages nor unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation are proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court may award damages caused by misappropriation measured in terms of a reasonable

7

royalty." See O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-762 and 10-1-763.14 Thus, although the Court does not ignore Plaintiffs'

emphasis throughout their pleadings to having suffered harm in Fulton County, Georgia where they are
headquartered,15 nevertheless, Defendants' focus on Georgia as the place where Plaintiffs' economic
injury was ultimately suffered is misplaced with respect to the trade secrets claims.16
Instead, in analyzing conflict of law issues in trade secret cases, Georgia federal courts have held
the lex loci delicti is the place where the tortious act of misappropriation and use of the trade secret
occurred. See, e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (11th Cir. 2005) (where Ohio
company brought trade secrets claim under Ohio and Georgia law against former employee who
previously worked for the company in Florida but took a job in Georgia with a competitor and where
Ohio company alleged it had entrusted former employee with trade secret information that would
inevitability be used during employment with Georgia competitor, Georgia law governed); Salsbury
Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd as modified, 908 F.2d 706
(11th Cir. 1990) (Georgia law, rather than Iowa law, applied to poultry vaccine manufacturer's claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information because, although the vaccine allegedly
misappropriated by competitor was developed in Iowa, misappropriation and use of trade secrets occurred
at competitor's Georgia laboratory).
On this issue the Court finds the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws instructive:
The relative importance of the contacts ... varies somewhat with the nature of the
tort involved. Thus, the place of injury is of particular importance in the case of
personal injuries and of injuries to tangible things (see§§ 146- 147). The same is
true in the case of false imprisonment and of malicious prosecution and abuse of
process (see § 155). On the other hand, the place of injury is less significant in
the case of fraudulent misrepresentations (see § 148) and of such unfair
competition as consists of false advertising and the misappropriation of trade
values. The injury suffered through false advertising is the loss of customers or of
trade. Such customers or trade will frequently be lost in two or more states. The
effect of the loss, which is pecuniary in its nature, will normally be felt most
severely at the plaintiffs headquarters or principal place of business. But this
place may have only a slight relationship to the defendant's activities and to the
14

Similarly, the New Mexico TSA and Ohio TSA authorize both injunctive relief and damages. See N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3A-3, 57-3A-4; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 1333.62, 1333.63.
15
See, e.g., FAC, iJ,r 5-6, 41, 104, 107, 116, 120, 122, 130, 138, 144, 150.
16
Here, Plaintiffs seek both injunctive relief and damages. See FAC, ,r,r 104, 107, 151-160.

8

plaintiffs loss of customers or trade. The situation is essentially the same when
misappropriation of the plaintiffs trade values is involved, except that the
plaintiff may have suffered no pecuniary loss but the defendant rather may have
obtained an unfair profit. For all these reasons, the place of injury does not play
so important a role for choice-of-law purposes in the case of false advertising and
the misappropriation of trade values as in the case of other kinds of torts. Instead,
the principal location of the defendant's conduct is the contact that will usually be
given the greatest weight in determining the state whose local law determin es the
rights and liabilities that arise from false advertising and the misappropriation of
trade values.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 145 (1971).
Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendants' employees unlawfully accessed and used the DMV records of
Plaintiffs' customers in New Mexico and Ohio to contact them "in order to unlawfully steal" those New
Mexico and Ohio customers.

17

Thus, the allegedly improper access and misappropriation of customer

information, if any, occurred in New Mexico and Ohio such that New Mexico and Ohio law, respectively,
govern Plaintiffs' trade secret claims regarding Defendants' alleged conduct in those states. Further, the
Court does not find that Georgia's public policy exception requires application of Georgia law. The TSA
adopted in Georgia, New Mexico and Ohio are each modeled after the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and
otherwise have substantially similar definitions of what constitutes a trade secret.
b. New Mexico TSA and Ohio TSA
Under the New Mexico TSA,
[a] "trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique or process, that: ( 1) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3A-2(D).

Pursuant to the Ohio TSA,
[a] "trade secret means information, including the whole or any portion or phase
of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or improvement, or
any business information or plans, financial information, or listing of names,
addresses, or telephone numbers, that satisfies both of the following: (1) It
17

F AC, ml 90-92.
9

derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. (2) It is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 1333.61(D).
Neither state appears to absolutely mandate that a customer list be in tangible form in order to be
protected under the state's TSA. See Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, 2008-Ohio-292, ~ 24, 117 Ohio

St. 3d 58, 64, 881 N.E.2d 850, 855; State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency,
2000-Ohio-282, 88 Ohio St. 3d 166,172,724 N.E.2d 411,417; Mesarvey, Russell & Co. v. Boyer, No.
91AP-974, 1992 WL 185656, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1992), cause dismissed sub nom. Mesarvey,
Russel & Co. v. Boyer, 65 Ohio St. 3d 1447, 601 N.E.2d 42 (1992); Interstate Serv. Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
McIntire, No. C-890346, 1991 WL 1386, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1991); Valeo Cincinnati, Inc. v.
N&D Machining Serv., Inc, No. 8108537, 1984 WL 7127, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Valeo Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St. 3d 41,492 N.E.2d 814 (1986).
Rapid Temps, Inc. v. Lamon, 2008-NMCA-122, ~ 23, 144 N.M. 804, 809, 192 P.3d 799,804.
Both Ohio and New Mexico courts have found that "listings" or "compilations" of customer
information may be considered trade secrets, even if some of the information is publicly available. See
State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 88 Ohio St. 3d 166, 173, 724
N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ohio 2000); Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, 117 Ohio St. 3d 58, 59, 881 N.E.2d
850, 851 (Ohio 2008). Compare Berardi's Fresh Roast, Inc. v. PMD Enterprises, Inc., 2008 WL 4681825,
2008-Ohio-5470, ~ 24 (Ohio 2008). See Rapid Temps, Inc. v. Lamon, 144 N.M. 804, 809, 192 P.3d 799,
804 (New Mexico 2008). Compare Insure New Mexico, LLC v. McGonigle, 2000-NMCA-018, ~~ 14-15,
128 N.M. 611, 615-16, 995 P.2d 1053, 1057-58.
Further, under both New Mexico and Ohio law whether particular information constitutes a trade
secret is generally a question of fact. See Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 N.M. 601, 609(C)(I), 190
P.3d 322, 330 (2008) ("The existence of a trade secret ordinarily is a question of fact .. .It is also one of the
most elusive and difficult concepts in the law to define ... Evaluating trade secret status therefore "requires
10

an ad hoc evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances. For this reason, the question of whether certain
information constitutes a trade secret ordinarily is best resolved by a fact finder after full presentation of
evidence from each side") (citing Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc .. 342 F.3d 714, 723
(7th Cir.2003)); Fred Siegel Co., LP.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St. 3d 171, 181, 707 N.E.2d 853,
862 (Ohio 1999) ("A possessor of a potential trade secret must take some active steps to maintain its
secrecy in order to enjoy presumptive trade secret status, and a claimant asserting trade secret status has
the burden to identify and demonstrate that the material is included in categories of protected information
under the statute ... The question whether a particular knowledge or process is a trade secret is, however, a
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact upon the greater weight of the evidence").
Finally, each state defines misappropriation to include the "acquisition of a trade secret of another
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means."

See N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-3A-2(B)(l); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1333.6l(B)(l). "Improper means" includes
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage through electronic or other means. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-3A-2(A); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§1333.6l(A). Cf E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970)
(taking aerial photography of a competitor's plant construction is an improper means of obtaining
another's trade secret which may be actionable).
Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendants unlawfully accessed OMV records to obtain not just
customers' identities but personal information regarding their customers and their related title loan
information; information which Plaintiffs allege is not readily available through lawful means and which
they have expended money, time and effort to maintain confidential and to protect from any unauthorized
access.

18

Given the authorities summarized above, the Court cannot conclude based on the pleadings that

Defendants have established Plaintiffs "could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief' as to their trade secret claims under New Mexico

18

FAC, ir,i 2, 49-54, 69-77, 79, 86-87, 92, 100-107.
11

and Ohio law. Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs trade secret misappropriation claims
19

related to Defendants' alleged conduct in New Mexico and Ohio is DENIED.

(2) Preemption of Counts II, Ill, IV, V, VI, and IX
Defendants urge Plaintiffs' trade secret claims preempt their unfair competition, tortious
interference, trespass, civil conspiracy and injunctive relief claims to the extent those claims are based on
alleged trade secret misappropriation. Although Defendants' analysis centers largely on Georgia law and
the preemption provision contained in the Georgia TSA, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767,

20

as held above, Plaintiffs'

trade secret claims are governed by the laws of state where the misappropriation occurred.
The New Mexico TSA does not contain a preemption provision. Thus, there can be no
preemption with respect to the trade secrets claim asserted under New Mexico law.
The Ohio TSA "displace[s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret" but does not affect "[ o ]ther civil remedies that are
not based on misappropriation of a trade secret." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.67. See Glasstech. Inc. v.
TGL Tempering Sys .• Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999) ("The preemption section of the
UTSA has been interpreted to bar claims which are based entirely on factual allegations of
misappropriation of trade secrets"); Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prod .• Inc., 933 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ("Where the common-law claim possesses an independent factual
basis separate from the factual allegations establishing a UTSA claim, then the portion of the claim
supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption") (citing Int'l Paper Co. v.
Goldschmidt. 872 F.Supp.2d 624, 635 (S.D. Ohio 2012). See also Exal Corp. v. Roeslein & Assocs .• Inc.,

19

As noted above, Plaintiffs also allege Defendants' conduct violates the TSA as adopted by Alabama, Utah,
Missouri, Virginia, Arizona, and Tennessee, although Plaintiffs do not specify how DMV records were accessed or
used in those states. To the extent Plaintiffs maintain Defendants improperly accessed or used DMV records in those
states and are asserting a trade secrets claim as to such conduct, that would have to be properly pied and such claims
would likewise be governed under those states' laws. Whether a trade secrets claim is actionable thereunder (e.g.,
whether the information obtained constitutes a trade secret, what information is/is not is publically available, etc.) is
better addressed with the benefit of evidence. The Court takes no position on whether Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims
will ultimately survive summary judgment.
20
O.C.G.A. §10-l-767(a) states: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, this article shall
supersede conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of
a trade secret."
12

No. 4:12-CV-01830, 2012 WL 4754748, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2012) ("After full review of the cases,
this Court finds most persuasive the opinions that require fuller factual development prior to ruling on
preemption. Acting prematurely can result in a scenario that strips Plaintiffs of any recovery, even though
they have been wronged").21
Here, Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims are predicated on allegations their customer list and related
title loan information constitute trade secrets which Defendants have misappropriated by unl awfully
searching OMV records in order to contact and solicit Plaintiffs' existing and prospective customers. To
the extent Plaintiffs' other tort claims are based on improperly obtainin g customers' information through
OMV records in Ohio, those claims would be preempted pursuant to the foregoing authorities.
Specifically, Count III, tortious interference with Drummond's prospective CSO contracts and business

relationships, is predicated entirely on the same factual allegations as the trade secrets claims;
i.e. improperly accessing OMV records to obtain Plaintiffs' customers' information (the alleged trade
secrets) to solicit their business. As such, under Ohio law, Count III would be preempted by the trade
secrets claims.
21

Similarly, the other named states' Trade Secret Acts only preempt common law tort claims to the extent
they are predicated on or derived from the same factual allegations as the trade secret claim. See Bell Aerospace
Servs .• Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs .• Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2010) ("[T]he company may not
pursue both statutory and common law theories of recovery for the ... alleged misappropriation of 'trade secrets' or
confidential documents" and, thus, "may not pursue its breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under a theory that is
essentially the same as its ATSA claim"); Madison Oslin. Inc. v. Interstate Res., Inc., No. 2: 11-CV-0 1343-SLB,
2012 WL 4730877, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2012) ("To the extent plaintiffs plead common law causes of action
based on the same underlying facts as those giving rise to their claim under the ATSA ... such causes of action are
preempted"); Unisource Worldwide. Inc. v. Swope, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1056 (D. Ariz. 2013) ("The AUTSA
expressly preempts all common-law tort claims for misappropriation of a trade secret. A.R.S. § 44-407. It does not
affect "[ o ]ther civil remedies that are not based on misappropriation of a trade secret") (citation omitted); Custom
Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc. v. Dowell, 918 F. Supp. 2d 916,936 (E.D. Mo. 2013) ("Claims based on facts
related to the misappropriation claim are derivative, and therefore preempted"); ProductiveMD, LLC v. 4UMD,
LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 955,964 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (citing Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d
649,658 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) ("[I]t is clear some of what [the plaintiff] characterizes as breaches of the duty of loyalty
are preempted by the TUTSA. Under the "same proof test, a claim is preempted "when it necessarily rises or falls
based on whether the defendant is found to have 'misappropriated' a 'trade secret'"); CDC Restoration & Const., LC
v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 2012 UT App 60, ~ 48,274 P.3d 317,331 ("[I]fproofofa non-UTSA claim would
also simultaneously establish a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, it is preempted irrespective o[f] whatever
surplus elements of proof were necessary to establish it. .. However, to whatever extent that a claim is based upon
wrongful conduct independent of the misappropriation of trade secrets or otherwise confidential information, it is
not preempted" (citation and punctuation omitted); MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (VUTSA), Va.Code e 59.1-341(A), preempts claims
predicated on a misappropriation of trade secrets"). See also Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §7(b) ("This Act does not
affect: ... (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret").
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However, the unfair competition, tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs'
prospective contracts and business relationships, trespass, civil conspiracy and injunctive relief claims are
all predicated on additional factual allegations of misconduct; e.g., trespassing on Plaintiffs' premises to

confront and solicit their customers and soliciting Plaintiffs' employees to provide referrals of Plaintiffs
customers in exchange for personal financial incentives.22 Given this, the Court cannot say based on the
pleadings that the foregoing claims are all preempted in their entirety such that they are subject to
dismissal in toto. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART as outlined above.
(3) Unfair competition (Count JI)
With respect to Count 11, unfair competition, Plaintiffs allege Defendants have: "surreptitiously''
recorded customers' license plate and VIN numbers to search DMV records and then searched DMV
records by lienholder for Plaintiffs' customers; trespassed onto Plaintiffs' properties in (at least) New
Mexico, Utah, Alabama, Virginia, Arizona and Georgia to solicit Plaintiffs' customers, including directly
confronting customers as well as leaving flyers offering cash and other financial incentives to induce
them to change companies; and solicited Plaintiffs' employees in New Mexico, Alabama, Missouri,
Arizona, Tennessee, and Georgia, offering them cash to divert Plaintiffs' current and prospective
customers from Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs allege Defendants' conduct violates statutes regarding
unfair competition in Utah, Ohio, New Mexico, and South Carolina and violates the common law of
Utah, Ohio, New Mexico, South Carolina, Missouri, Texas, Arizona and Tennessee.
Defendants urge Count II should be dismissed to the extent Plaintiffs seek to assert a claim under
South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practice Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 et seq. ("SCUPTA") and to the
extent they assert a common law claim for unfair competition.
a.

Unfair competition claim asserted under SCUPTA

SCUTPA broadly prohibits"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20. To state a SCUTPA
22

FAC, iM[ll0-111, I 19, 125-127, 132-135, 140, 154-155.
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claim, the plaintiff must allege "( 1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice, (2) that the
plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant's use of the unlawful trade
practice, and (3) that the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on
the public interest." Havird Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 149 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing S.C.
Code Ann.§ 39-5-140).
An impact on public interest may be shown if the acts or practices have the potential for
repetition. Burbach v. Inv'rs Mgmt. Corp. Int'l, 326 S.C. 492, 497, 484 S.E.2d 119, 121 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997). This "potential for repetition" may be demonstrated in either of two ways: (1) by showing the
same kind of actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to occur absent
deterrence, or (2) by showing the company's procedures create a potential for repetition of the unfair and
deceptive acts. Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc., 358 S.C. 369,379, 595 S.E.2d 461,466 (S.C. 2004).

See

also Ameristone Tile, LLC v. Ceramic Consulting Corp., 966 F. Supp. 2d 604, 621 (D.S.C. 2013) ("[T]he
plaintiff in a SCUTPA action is required only to allege and prove those facts sufficient to demonstrate
potential for repetition; at that point, [the] plaintiff has proven an adverse effect on the public interest
sufficient to recover under the SCUTP A").
Here, Defendants argue this claim fails under South Carolina law because Plaintiff failed to allege
an injury to the public interest. However, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants engaged in multiple
types of unfair and deceptive acts, including making misrepresentations about Plaintiffs' business to its
customers in order to mislead and deceive them, trespassing onto Plaintiffs' premises to aggressively
solicit Plaintiffs' customers in person in an effort to take away their business, and soliciting Plaintiffs'
employees by offering financial incentives to divert customers from Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs
further allege Defendants are not only continuing to engage in such conduct but that Defendants'
management encourages, promotes and/or ratifies such conduct. These allegations are sufficient to state a
claim for unfair competition under SCUPT A. As such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II under
SCUPTA is DENIED.
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b.

Common law claims alleging unfair competition

"In the absence of a statute ... at least with respect to a state where the common law is in force, a
Georgia court will apply the common law as expounded by the courts of Georgia." Coon v. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 300 Ga. 722, 729, 797 S.E.2d 828, 834 (2017). See Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 710, 148 S.E. 741, 743
(1929) ("The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American states where it prevails.
Though courts in the different states may place a different construction upon a principle of common law,
that does not change the law. There is still only one right construction. If all the American states were to
construe the same principle of common law incorrectly, the common law would be unchanged").
Thus, while Georgia courts "will follow the decisions of a sister state in construing the statutes
thereof, they are not bound by the interpretation placed upon the common law by the courts of other
states." Lay v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 Ga. 345, 62 S.E. 189, 189 (1908). See Krogg v. Atlanta
& W.P.R. Co., 77 Ga. 202, 214 (1886) ("We are not bound by the interpretation of the common law, as
made by the courts of Alabama; as to what is the common law on this subject, this court is not only
competent to decide, although the accident occurred in Alabama, but it is its duty to decide, the common
law being the same [in] both jurisdictions"); In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1 :07MD-1845-TWT, 2012 WL 3779088, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012) ("Although the rule in Georgia is lex
loci delicti, there are exceptions if the lex loci delicti is foreign law. One exception is the application of
common law. Foreign law does not apply if no foreign statutes are involved") (citing Leavell v. Bank of
Commerce. 169 Ga. App. 626, 627, 314 S.E.2d 678 (1984); other citations and punctuation omitted). See
also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1
(2003). Thus, here, Plaintiffs' common law tort claims alleging unfair competition must be construed
pursuant to the "common law as expounded by the courts of Georgia." Coon, 300 Ga. at 729.
"[I]n Georgia the term unfair competition is a nomenclature for the doctrine that one cannot pass
off his goods as those of another." Nationwide Advert. Serv., Inc. v. Thompson Recruitment Advert., Inc.,
183 Ga. App. 678,682,359 S.E.2d 737, 741 (1987) (citing Hayes v. Hallmark Apts., 232 Ga. 307(3), 207
S.E.2d 197 (1974)). As summarized by the Supreme Court of Georgia:
16

Unfair competition is a form of unlawful business injury. It consists in passing
off, or attempting to pass off, on the public, the goods or business of one person
as and for the goods or business of another. It consists essentially in the conduct

of a trade or business in such a manner that there is either an express or
implied representation to that effect. In fact, it may be stated broadly that any
conduct, the nature and probable tendency and effect of which is to deceive the
public so as to pass off the goods or business of one person as and for the goods
or business of another, constitutes actionable unfair competition. The essence
thereof consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those
of another. It is the palming off by one of his goods as the goods of another, and
nothing less than conduct tending to pass off one man's goods or business as the
goods or business of another will constitute unfair competition. The basic
principle of the law of unfair competition is that no one has a right to dress up his
goods or business or otherwise represent the same in such manner as to deceive
an intending purchaser and induce him to believe he is buying the goods of
another, and that no one has a right to avail himself of another's favorable
reputation in order to sell his own goods. The present tendency is to decide every
case on the ground of unfair competition, by making the decision tum on whether
or not the effect of what was done is to pass off the goods or business of one man
as the goods or business of another. Unless it appears that there is or will
probably be a deception of ordinary buyers and the general public into thinking
that the goods or business of one is the business or goods of another and thus
bring about the sale of one man's goods as the goods of the other, the case is
damnum absque injuria for which no action lies.
Atlanta Paper Co. v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 184 Ga. 205, 212-13, 190 S.E. 777, 782-83 (1937). See Kay
Jewelry Co. v. Kapiloff, 204 Ga. 209, 209, 49 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1948) ("In our reported cases where the
question of unfair trade competition was involved, the litigants were engaged in a competitive business or
dealt in competitive goods, and the 'passing off rule has been sufficient to afford a test as to whether
there was unfair competition. The test under this rule is whether the goods or business of one are in fact
'passed off as the goods or business of another, and it has been said, in cases between litigants in actual
and direct market competition, that nothing less than such conduct will constitute unfair competition");
Carter v. Carter Elec. Co., 156 Ga. 297, 119 S.E. 737, 740 (1923) ("The essence of the wrong in unfair
competition consists in the sale of the goods of one person for that of another; and if defendant is not
attempting to palm off its goods as those of complainant the action fails"). See also Saunders Sys. Atlanta
Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co. of Georgia, 158 Ga. 1, 123 S.E. 132, 133, 135 (1924) (noting "the doctrine of
secondary meaning ... is the origin of the law of unfair competition, as distinguished from technical trademarks or trade-names: 'If the defendant, as a matter of fact, by his conduct is passing off his goods as the
17

plaintiffs goods, or his business as plaintiffs business, a case of unfair competition is made. The test is
whether the public is likely to be deceived"') (citing Reddaway v. Banham, 65 L. J. Q. B. 381 (1896)).

See, e.g., Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 42, 222 S.E.2d 322, 330 (1976); Multiple Listing Serv., Inc. v.
Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 223 Ga. 837, 841-42, 159 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1968), as modified, 225 Ga. 129, 166
S.E.2d 356 (1969); Dolphin Homes Corp. v. Tocomc Dev. Corp .. 223 Ga. 455,456, 156 S.E.2d 45, 47
(1967); Citizens Jewelry Co. v. Savelle Jewelry Co. of Albany, 219 Ga. 409,411, 133 S.E.2d 858,860
(1963); Gordy v. Dunwody, 209 Ga. 627, 634, 74 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1953), as modified, 210 Ga. 810, 83
S.E.2d 7 (1954); Fraser v. Singer, 211 Ga. 26, 27, 83 S.E.2d 599, 600 (1954); First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. First Fin. & Thrift Corp., 207 Ga. 695, 64 S.E.2d 58 (1951); Gano v. Gano, 203 Ga. 637, 640-41,
47 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1948); Indus. Inv. Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga. 437, 138 S.E. 908 (1927); Rome Mach. &
Foundry Co. v. Davis Foundry & Mach. Works Works, 135 Ga. 17, 68 S.E. 800, 800 (1910); First
Georgia Leasing, Inc. v. First Georgia Bank, 188 Ga. App. 847,847,374 S.E.2d 751, 751 (1988).
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant attempted to deceive the public by
"passing off, or attempting to pass off, on the public, the goods or business of [Plaintiffs] as and for the
goods or business of [Defendants]." Atlanta Paper Co., 184 Ga. at 212. Further, Plaintiffs have not
provided any Georgia authority supporting Plaintiffs' "broad view of unfair competition. "

23

Absent such,

the Court is compelled to find Plaintiffs' common law unfair competition claims fail as a matter of
Georgia law. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRAN TED as to those common law unfair competition
claims.

24

(4) Tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective CSO contracts and
business relationships (Count IV/5
With respect to Count IV, Plaintiffs allege Defendants "willfully and intentionally" interfered
with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships by, inter alia: entering

23

Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 24.
However, Plaintiffs' unfair competition claims asserted under the statutes of Utah, Ohio, New Mexico, and
South Carolina remain for adjudication.
25
Insofar as the Court has already dismissed Count III (tortious interference with Drummond's prospective
CSO contracts and business relationships) as preempted by Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims, it is not addressed here.
24
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Plaintiffs' store properties to solicit Plaintiffs' customers directly by offering cash or other financial
incentives and representing Defendants can offer a lower interest rate title loan despite not knowing the
interest rates offered by Plaintiffs; and soliciting Plaintiffs' employees by offering them cash to divert
Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers to Defendants.26 Plaintiffs allege such conduct has caused

them injury, including the "the loss of business goodwill and loss of interest payments they would have
otherwise received under the prospective title loan contracts", and assert Defendants' conduct violates the
laws of Alabama, Utah, Ohio, Missouri, Virginia, Texas, New Mexico, South Carolina, Arizona,
Tennessee and Georgia.27
Although Plaintiffs generally allege Defendants' conduct violates certain states' laws, they fail to
specify any specific statutory authority in the relevant states under which they assert Count IV. As such,
the Court must presume they are asserted under the common law and, for the same reasons summarized in
Part I(B)(3)(b), supra, the Court construes Plaintiffs' common law claims alleging tortious interference
with Plaintiffs' contracts and business relations under Georgia law. See Coon, 300 Ga. at 729; Slaton, 168
Ga. at 710; Lay, 131 Ga. at 345. Krogg, 77 Ga. at 214.
As construed in Georgia,
[t]he elements of tortious interference with contractual relations, business
relations, or potential business relations are: (1) improper action or
wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant
acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure; (3) the
defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party
or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business
relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct
proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.
Northeast Georgia Cancer Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 28, 33,
676 S.E.2d 428, 433 (2009). "For purposes of this type of tort, 'privilege' means legitimate economic
interests of the defendant or a legitimate relationship of the defendant to the contract, so that it is not
considered a stranger, interloper, or meddler." Disaster Servs., Inc. v. ERC P'ship, 228 Ga. App. 739, 741,
492 S.E.2d 526,529 (1997). Further, "'[m]alice' in th[is] context means any unauthorized interference or
26

27

FAC, iMJ 125-127.
FAC, iMJ 128, 130.
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any interference without legal justification or excuse." Carroll An esthesia Assocs., P.C. v. AnestheCare,
Inc., 234 Ga. App. 646, 648, 507 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1998) (citing Arford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434,
441(13), 405 S.E.2d 698 (1991)).
Improper, non-privileged conduct is an essential element of this tort. Thus, the "[p]laintiff must
show more than that the defendant simply persuaded a person to break a contract." Kirkland v. Tamplin,
285 Ga. App. 241, 244, 645 S.E.2d 653, 656 (2007) (citations omitted). Rather, the "plaintiff must adduce
evidence of "improper action or wrongful conduct," which Georgia courts have defined to mean
"wrongfu l action that generally involves predatory tactics such as physical violence, fraud or
misrepresentation, defam ation, use of confidential information, abusive civil suits, and unwarranted
crimin al prosecutions." Id.
In moving to dismiss the tortious interference claims, Defendants assert competitive behavior is
not actionable in tort and Plaintiffs have "failed to demonstrate that. .. Defendants' alleged conduct was
not privileged." 28 Further, Defendants argue Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead damages and "failed to

identify a single contract that was breached or a prospective business relationship that was lost as a result
of Defendants' alleged conduct.?" Having considered the pleadings and allegations in support of the
tortious interference claims, summarized supra, and construing the allegations in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled each element of Count IV so as to satisfy
Georgia's notice pleading standard." Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Count IV.
U.

TITLEMAX GEORGIA'S MOTION TO ADD PARTIES
In this action TitleMax Georgia asserts counterclaims against Plaintiffs North American Title

Loans, LLC ("NATL") and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. ("CLM") for violations of the Lanham Act,
unfair business practices and civil conspiracy. In its Motion to Add Parties, TitleMax Georgia requests
leave of Court to file an amended pleading adding various parties as counterclaim defendants pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 or, alternatively, under O.C.G.A. §9-11-20. Specifically, Defendant seeks to add:
28
29

30

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 19.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 20.
See, e.g., FAC, ,i,i 86-89, 92-95, 98, 119-122, 125-130.
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(1) AndR, Inc.; (2) Atlanta Title Loans, Inc.; (3) Aycox,Inc.; (4) Aycox & Aycox Clayton, Inc.; (5)
Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc.; (6) Aycox Enterprises, Ltd.; (7) Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc.;
(8) Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc.; (9) LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; and (10) Mableton Car Title
Loans, Inc. (collectively the "Missing Parties"). Defendant asserts these Missing Parties and potentially
others as of yet unidentified entities are affiliates of Plaintiffs and they own and/or operate the majority of
the title pawn stores in Georgia which Defendant alleges in its counterclaim are violating state and federal
law and are allegedly engaging in deceptive trade practices, including misleading advertising, and civil
conspiracy to engage in deceptive trade practices.
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19, a new party must be joined when "complete relief cannot be afforded
among those who are already parties" in its absence. See also O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-13(h) ("When the
presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in
the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants as provided in this chapter, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained"). "The concept of complete
relief embraces the desirability of avoiding repetitive lawsuits on essentially the same facts or subject
matter, as well as the desirability of joining those in whose absence there might be a grant of hollow or
partial relief to the parties before the court." Searcy v. Searcy, 280 Ga. 311, 313 (2006). Under O.C.G.A.
§9-11-20 parties may be joined when they assert----or have asserted against them-any right to relief
"arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action."
Here, given the procedural history of this case, the positions taken by the parties during the course
of these proceedings with respect to their respective title pawn enterprises operating in Georgia, and the
nature of the counterclaims and relief sought by Defendants, the Court agrees joinder of the Missing
Parties is appropriate pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-19. Further, the Court finds permissive joinder under
O.C.G .A. §9-11-20 would also be authorized insofar as Defendant seeks to assert a right to relief against
the Missing Parties arising out of the same "series of transactions or occurrences" as alleged in its
counterclaim (e.g., an alleged enterprise-wide practice of engaging in misleading advertising in violation
21

of state and federal law) and comm on question of law or fact exist given Defendant alleges the Missing
Parties are engaging in similar unfair practices, including using similar advertising and trade dress.
Accordingly, TitleMax Georgia's Motion to Add Parties is hereby GRANT ED and the Court
orders that the Missing Parties be added as counterclaim defendants in this action. Within ten (l 0) days of
the entry of this order Plaintiffs shall supplement their discovery responses to identify any additional
third-party affiliates that have owned or operated stores in Georgia since December 29, 2010 or notify
Defendant that no such additional affiliates exist. Those additional third-party affiliates, if any, shall also
be added as counterclaim defendants. Within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this order, Defendant
TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. must file its amended pleading adding the foregoing parties and must thereafter
promptly perfect service upon those added parties.

III.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND III OF DEFENDANTS'
AMENDED TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM AND MOTION
TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND III OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND AMENDED
TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM31
In their Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim as asserted m the Amended Answer,

Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim ("Amended Answer and Counterclaim") and Second Amended
Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim ("Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim"), certain
TMX Defendants assert a counterclaim against certain Drummond Plaintiffs32 alleging misappropriation
and theft of trade secrets (Counterclaim II) and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, O.C.G.A. §§16-14-1 et seq. (Counterclaim III), among other
claims. The Drummond Respondents moved to dismiss Counterclaims II and III for failure to state a
31

See note 6, supra. Although the parties repeatedly reference matters outside of the pleadings in their
respective briefs and make assertions regarding what evidence does or does not exist, the Court here has limited its
review of this motion to the pleadings.
32
The Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim as asserted in Defendants' Amended Answer and Second
Amended Answer are specifically brought by: TitleMax of Ohio, Inc.; TitleMax of Utah, Inc.; TitleMax of Virginia,
Inc.; TitleMax of Alabama, Inc.; TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.; TitleMax of Arizona, Inc.; TitleMax of Missouri, Inc.;
TitleMax of Texas, Inc.; and TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc. (collectively referred to in this Section as "TitleMax
Claimants"). Their counterclaims have been asserted against: Drummond Financial Services, LLC, North American
Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a South Carolina limited
liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; Anderson Financial
Services, LLC; Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; LoanMax, LLC; Mid-American Title Loans, LLC; Fairfax Financial
Services, LLC; Wellshire Financial Services, LLC; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc., and Meadowwood Financial
Services, LLC (collectively referred to in this Section as "Drummond Respondents").
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claim, asserting the TitleMax Claimants failed to allege sufficient facts in support of those counterclaims.
The TitleMax Claimants thereafter filed their Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim to include
additional factual allegations in support thereof. The Drummond Respondents have again moved to
dismiss, asserting the amended pleading still fails to state a claim as to Counterclaims II and III.

A. Misappropriation of trade secret
In their Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, the TitleMax Claimants allege, inter alia:
[Drummond Respondents] sent their employees (sometimes known as
"Operations Specialists") to [TitleMax Claimants'] stores under false pretenses.
[Drummond Respondents'] Operations Specialists filled out pawn applications
even though they did not need to pawn anything, lied about their employers, and
utilized other fraudulent means of obtaining information that would be useful in
competing against [TitleMax Claimants].
Among other things, on multiple occasions, [Drummond Respondents']
Operations Specialists asked to use the bathroom in [TitleMax Claimants']
stores, which are located in non-public areas of those stores. On the way to and
from the bathroom, [Drummond Respondents'] Operations Specialists would
illegally trespass on non-public areas of [TitleMax Claimants'] stores via
false pretenses and surreptitiously photograph financial [sic] [TitleMax
Claimants'] confidential and proprietary information. The financial information
illegally obtained by [Drummond Respondents'] Operations Specialists included
[TitleMax Claimants'] "goal boards" which are summaries of sales targets (based
on past performance) and financial progress.33
TitleMax Claimants assert, for example, that Zachary Farmer, one the Drummond Respondents'
Operations Specialists, emailed his supervisor multiple pictures of TitleMax Claimants' "goal boards and
other documents containing confidential and proprietary information.?" TitleMax Claimants allege their
trade secrets include, among other things, the goal boards the Drummond Respondents illegally
photographed and misappropriated through unlawful access and disclosure to unauthorized persons.35
In their motion, Drummond Respondents urge TitleMax Claimants have not alleged facts
sufficient to show that they made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information displayed
on their goal boards. Further, they assert TitleMax Claimants cannot show that they maintained the
secrecy of their alleged trade secrets because the information was posted on or near goal boards that were
33
34
35

Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ,ii] 36-37 at pp. 43-44.
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, i!38 at p. 44.
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ,i48-50 at p. 47.
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accessible to the general public in high-traffic areas and TitleMax employees undisputedly allowed the
public access to view the information on the way to and from the bathroom.
However, regardless of which state law applies, the issues raised in Drumm ond Respondents'
motions are matters which cannot be resolved based on the pleadings. TitleMax Claimants allege that they
took "reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the[ir] confidential information" but that Drumm ond
employees posing as potential customers/vendors, although given permi ssion to use the bathroom in nonpublic store areas, would then "illegally trespass on non-public areas ... [ of the] stores via false pretenses"
in order to photograph TitleMax Claimants' confidential and proprietary information. The reasonableness
of TitleMax Claimants' actions to maintain this information secret (which may very well depend on
where exactly the goal boards and other allegedly confidential and proprietary information were located,
whether any Drumm ond employees exceeded the permi ssion given to go to the bathroom to access other
non-public areas, etc.) is a matter which cannot be assessed at the pleadings stage. The claim has been
sufficiently pled such that the Drumm ond Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED with

respect to the misappropriation of trade secrets claim. 36
B. RICO claim
"To assert a civil claim based upon either a violation of the RICO statute or a conspiracy to
violate that statute, a plaintiff must show that the defendants violated or conspired to violate
the RICO statute; that as a result of this conduct the plaintiff has suffered injury; and that the defendant's
violation of or conspiracy to violate the RICO statute was the proximate cause of the injury." Wylie v.
Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165, 746 S.E.2d 689, 693 (2013) (citing Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates. 319
Ga. App. 101, 109(2)(b), 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012)).
Under Georgia's RICO statute, it is "unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering
activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including money." O.C.G.A. §

36

The Court takes no position on whether TitleMax Claimants' trade secrets claims will ultimately survive
summary judgment.
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16-14-4(a). A "racketeering activity," also known as a "predicate act," is the commi ssion of, the attempt
to commi t, or the solicitation or coercing of another to commi t a "crime which is chargeable by
indictment" under certain laws of the state of Georgia and the United States. O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(5);
Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 164. Further, "pattern of racketeering activity" means to engage in at least two
acts of racketeering activity that are "interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
incidents" and that were done "in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, or transactions."
O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4).
Here, the Drumm ond Respondents assert the TitleMax Claimants have failed to state a RICO
claim because: they cann ot allege sufficient facts to show they made reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of their alleged trade secret information; the "racketeering activity" on which the claim is
predicated did not occur in Georgia and, thus, does not constitute a "theft of trade secrets" under
Georgia's crimi nal law; and the proximate-cause standard applicable to RICO claims has not been met.
For the reasons stated above, the reasonableness of the TitleMax Claimants' actions to maintain
the secrecy of their trade secrets has been sufficiently alleged and whether evidence can be produced in
support of those allegations is to be determi ned. Further, the Court finds the RICO claim has been
adequately pled.
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Although the Drummond Respondents contend all of the racketeering activity alleged

by TitleMax Claimants occurred out of state such that it does not give rise to a Georgia RICO claim,
TitleMax Claimants allege the Drummond Respondents repeatedly directed their employees to visit
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The Drummond Respondents also assert the TitleMax Claimants have failed to plead their Georgia RICO
claim with the requisite particularity, citing Pombert v. Glock. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2016). See Id. at
1335 (citing Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.2007)) ("RICO claims 'are
essentially a certain breed of fraud claims, [and] must be pied with an increased level of specificity'"). Notably, the
court in Pombert relied on another federal district case (see Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co.) where the RICO claim
was predicated on allegations of fraud and where that court in turn relied on other federal authority predicated on
fraud allegations (see Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 1 I 6 F.3d I 364, 1381 (1 I th Cir. 1997)) as
well the federal pleading standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having considered the
TitleMax Claimants' amended pleadings, given the current posture of the case, and in light of Georgia's notice
pleading standard and that there is no binding authority indicating all RICO claims, even those not predicated on
fraud, are nevertheless subject to a heightened pleadings standard under O.C.G.A. §9-11-9, the Court finds the
RICO claim has been sufficiently pied. See also Maddox v. S. Eng'g Co., 216 Ga. App. 6, 7 (1994) (error to dismiss
RICO claim which was based on defendants' alleged violation ofO.C.G.A. §16-10-20, for making false statements
to government entities where the plaintiff did not specify what false statements were made, noting the defendants
could move for a more definite statement).
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TitleMax stores, including stores in Texas, South Carolina, Alabama and Ohio, to obtain financial
information through improper and/or unlawful means and that TitleMax's trade secret information once
obtained was then "shared across the [Drummond Respondents'] corporate structure.t'" Based on the
pleadings, the Court cannot says as a matter of law that the TitleMax Claimants "could not possibly
introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the
relief sought" as to the civil RICO claim.
Finally, the Drummond Defendants assert the applicable proximate cause requirement to assert a
RICO claim cannot possibly be met here.
To satisfy the proximate cause element of RICO, a plaintiff must show that her
injury flowed directly from at least one of the predicate acts. Longino v. Bank of

Ellijay, 228 Ga. App. 37, 41(2), 491 S.E.2d 81 (1997). This burden is not met
where a plaintiff shows "merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of
the [predicate act] or that he would not have been injured but for the [predicate
act]." Maddox v. Southern Engineering Co., 231 Ga. App. 802, 806(1), 500
S.E.2d 591 (1998) ... Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting
a RICO claim must allege more than that an act of racketeering occurred and that
she was injured. Longino, supra. Rather, she must show that her injury was
the direct result of a predicate act targeted toward her, such that she was the
intended victim. Nicholson, [257 Ga. App. 429, 431(1), 571 S.E.2d 466
(2002)] ... See also Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341
F.3d 1292, 1307(2) (11th Cir.2003) (in determining whether a plaintiff has
satisfactorily alleged a RICO claim, a court should examine whether the
alleged predicate acts were aimed at the plaintiff or whether they were
aimed primarily at a third party) ...
Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 166.
In the case at bar, the TitleMax Claimants have alleged the Drummond Respondents took direct
action against them, targeting their stores by sending their employees to unlawfully acquire their financial
trade secret information to gain a competitive advantage over them in the marketplace and resulting in
damage to them specifically, including the loss of prospective customers, loss of business goodwill and
loss of interest payments under prospective contracts. The TitleMax Claimants have sufficiently alleged
injury proximately caused by the Drummond Respondents' alleged racketeering activity. The Drummond
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss the civil RICO claim is hereby DENIED.
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Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, iJ39.
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IV.

DISCOVE RY RE LATED MOTIONS AN D DISPUTES
A. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel regarding First Interrogatories and RPDs

In their latest Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel Defendants to produce
information and documents: related to Defendants' alleged misconduct in specific Named States'";
regarding Defendants use of DMV records to solicit Plaintiffs' customers; and from certain categories of
custodians likely to have electronically stored information ("ESI") relevant to Plaintiffs' claims.
(1) Discovery related to Defendants' operations and alleged tortious conduct in Named States
Plaintiffs seek information and documents related to Defendants and their employees' alleged
misconduct in the Named States, including information regarding: Defendants and their employees' use
of DMV databases; employees who engaged in DMV Searching and their supervisors; persons contacted
using DMV record information and the employees who contacted them; and employees who offered to
pay referral fees to Plaintiffs' employees for the referral of business (see Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories
Nos. 2-7).
Also, Plaintiffs seek documents and communications identifying and/or related to: Defendants'
offices, stores, or branches located in the Named States; Defendants' employees' marketing of services in
the parking lots of Plaintiffs' offices, stores or branches and their marketing to and soliciting business
from persons entering or leaving Plaintiffs' premises; Defendants' employees' recording, copying or
acquiring the license plate or vehicle identification numbers of vehicles located in the parking lots of
Plaintiffs' premises; Defendants' employees' offering Plaintiffs' employees/agents incentives to refer
persons to Defendants; Defendants' employees' visiting Plaintiffs' premises in the Named Stated for the
purpose of marketing Defendants' services to Plaintiffs' employees; Defendants' employees' DMV
Searching; any contracts or agreements between Defendants or their employees and any other person or
DMV database providing access to motor vehicle records; Defendants' employees' use of DMV
databases in connection with marketing to Plaintiffs' current or potential customers in the Named States;
39

The Named States as defined in Plaintiffs' discovery requests include: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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docum ents or comm unications obtained from any OMV database regarding Plaintiffs' curr ent or former
customers in the Named States; docum ents or comm unications exchanged between employees and
Plaintiffs related to the conduct alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint; Defendants' practices, policies and
procedures relating to the marketing of Defendants' services to current or potential customers and to
Plaintiffs' current or potential customers; and disciplinary action taken with respect to any
employees/agents for OMV Searching, offering to pay/paying referral fees to Plaintiffs' employees/agents
in exchange for the referral of business, or for marketing Defendants' services in the parking lots of
Plaintiffs' premises (see Plaintiff First Requests for Production of Documents ("RPO") Nos. 1, 3-10, 12-

17,19,50).
The Court is compelled to note this motion is directed to certain discovery requests which this
Court already ordered produced in its Feb. 17, 2017 Order on Discovery Disputes; e.g. Plaintiffs' First
Interrogatories Nos. 2-6 and First RPO Nos. 12, 13, 15, and 50. If they have not done so already,
Defendants must comply with the Court's previous order compelling full and complete responses to the
foregoing discovery requests.
Further, although Defendants object to Plaintiffs' discovery requests seeking information and
documents with respect to non-party affiliates given the parties' agreement to adhere to third-party
discovery practice regarding affiliated non-parties to this case, any such agreement was not formalized on
the record by stipulation or consent order and such would not relieve the parties of their discovery
obligations under the Civil Practice Act. To the extent responsive, non-privileged information is available
to Defendants and/or Defendants have responsive, non-privileged documents or communications within
their "possession, custody, or control", they are obligated to produce same. See O.C.G.A. §9-1 l-33(a)
("Any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served
or, ... who shall furnish such information as is available to the party"); O.C.G.A. §9-11-34(a) ("Any party
may serve on any other party a request: (1) To produce ... any tangible things which constitute or contain
matters within the scope of subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-26 and which are in the possession,
custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served"). See also Lion Antique Cars &
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Investments, Inc. v. Tafel, 332 Ga. App. 824, 826, 775 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2015) (in dispute between
company and former associates to recover race cars, no abuse of discretion in holding company in
contempt for failing to produce documents related to non-party's use of car as ordered given evidence of
close relationship between company's president and non-party and that company was able to obtain some
documents from non-party, demonstrating company had a measure of control over documents despite
being in non-party's possession).
The Court finds the requested discovery by Plaintiffs is likely to lead to the discovery of relevant
and admi ssible evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request to compel complete responses to First
Interrogatories Nos. 2-7 and First RPD Nos. 1, 3-10, 12-17, 19, and 30 is GRANTED and Defendants are

ordered to answer and produce any responsive documents in their possession, custody or control.
(2) DMV records
Plaintiffs request information regarding Defendants' employees' allegedly unlawful DMV
Searching, use of DMV databases and use of DMV records to solicit Plaintiffs' customers as set forth in
First RPD Nos. 12-16 and 50 (summarized above). The Court previously granted Plaintiffs' motion to
compel regarding First RPD Nos. 12, 13, 15, and 50. Again, if they have not done so already, Defendants
must comply with the Court's previous order requiring full and complete responses to the foregoing
discovery requests.
To the extent Defendants object to the discovery based on the Supreme Court's holding that
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under Georgia law, the Court's
rulings in Part I, supra, outline the relevant law applicable to Plaintiffs' claims as asserted in their
pleadings. In accordance with the Court's rulings herein, there remain claims at issue to which Plaintiffs'
discovery requests are relevant and are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. As such, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel responses to their First RPD Nos. 12-16 and 50 is
GRANTED.
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(3) ESI searches of custodians

The parties have already engaged in considerable discovery regarding ESL However, Plaintiffs
ask the Court to compel Defendants to search for ESI from "thousands of additional custodians",
specifically: employees in executive level positions (those holding the positions of President, Senior Vice
President of Operations, Vice President of Operations, and Divisional Vice President who had
responsibilities over any of the Named States) ("Executive custodians"); employees in managerial
positions (those holding the positions of Regional Manager, District Manager and General Managers with
responsibilities over any of the Named States) ("Management custodians"); Defendants' marketing
department and employees working therein ("Marketing custodians"); Defendants' Legal, Human
Resources, and Compliance Departments and employees therein ("Legal, HR, and Compliance
custodians"); and Defendants' store-level email addresses for stores in certain cities or within 10 miles
thereof (i.e. Albuquerque, New Mexico; Columbus, Ohio; Navarre, Ohio; Akron, Ohio; and Gaffney,
South Carolina) ("Store-level custodians").
Defendants agreed to search for and collect documents regarding 100 custodians. However,
Defendants contend Plaintiffs' requests would require searching ESI related to thousands of additional
employees and would cost millions of dollars. Defendants assert they have already incurred $1 million
related to ESI discovery to search for responsive documents from 100 custodians. They estimate ESI
discovery as to the additional custodians would cost approximately $10,000 per custodian. Further,
Defendants estimate Plaintiffs' additional requests would involve ESI related to an additional 5,700
employees given that: 205 employees fall into the categories of Executive custodians and Legal, HR, and
Compliance custodians; approximately 5,480 employees fall into the category of Management custodians;
and 15 employees would be considered Store-level custodians. Based on the foregoing, Defendants
estimate the additional cost to conduct ESI as to the additional custodians could be more than $50 million.
The Court previously directed counsel to meet and confer regarding the ESI dispute in order to
identify the custodians at issue, for Plaintiffs to particularize what information is sought and for the
parties to narrow requests accordingly so as to facilitate efficient and cost effective discovery. Although
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Defendants have provided the foregoing figures, Plaintiffs assert Defendants have failed to provide them
with specific information regarding the additional custodians which they contend is necessary to have an
informed discussion.
The Court orders Defendants to, within twenty (20) days of this order, provide Plaintiffs a list of
the additional 5,700 custodians they have identified including, where practical and available, each
individual's name, position, type of custodian and, where appropriate, geographic assignment. During that
same twenty (20) day period Plaintiffs should review the ESI already provided, and both sides should
consider the posture of the case and remaining claims in light of the Court's rulings herein.
Within twenty (20) days thereafter, counsel are directed to meet and confer in an informed, good faith
effort to narrow the number of custodians at issue. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the
parties must promptly notify the Court and within fifteen ( I 5) days of the meet and confer, Plaintiffs shall
supplement their Motion to Compel to identify with particularity the individual custodians to which they
assert additional searches for ESI should be conducted and the factual and legal basis supporting same.
Defendants shall have fifteen ( 15) days thereafter to provide any response. The parties are, again, warned
that, given the costs involved, if additional ESI is permitted the Court will consider cost shifting.

B. Defendants' Motion to Compel
Defendants ask the Court to compel Plaintiffs to fully respond to certain discovery requests.l"
Specifically, Defendants seek: (a) an audited balance sheet for each Plaintiff (Defendants' RPD No. 49);
(b) any documents concerning actions Plaintiffs take to determine where a former customer obtains a
loan, pawn, or credit services if bought out by another lender, pawnbroker, or Credit Services
Organization, sometimes referred to as "buy-outs" (Defendants' RPD No. 4); and (c) certain personnel
files maintained by Plaintiffs (Defendants' RPD Nos. 34, 35, 38, 42, 47).41

40

See generally Defendants' Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents (hereinafter Defendants'

"RPD").
41

Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' unilateral temporal limitation placed on certain interrogatory responses
has been mooted by Plaintiffs' supplemental discovery responses.
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(I) Audited balance sheets

The Court finds Defendants have at least made a prima facie showing of the factual basis
supporting their claim for punitive damages and the requested discovery is relevant and discoverable with
respect to that claim. See Holman v. Burgess, 404 S.E.2d 144, 147 (Ga. App. 1991). Accordingly,
Defendants' request to compel a response to RPO No. 49 is GRANTED.
(2) Documents related to buy-outs
The Court finds Defendants' request for documentation of how Plaintiffs track customer "buyouts" is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims
and on the issue of damages. Accordingly, Defendants' request to compel a response to RPO No. 4 is
GRANTED IN PART. To the extent Plaintiffs in the regular course of business maintain any such
documentation tracking buy-outs, same must be produced and provided to Defendants. If no such
documentation exists, Plaintiffs must so advise Defendants in their response to RPO No. 4. The foregoing
notwithstanding, any such tracking conducted by an attorney in preparation for litigation remams
privileged and is protected from discovery. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-l l-26(b)(l), 24-5-50l(a)(2).
(3) Personnel files
Defendants' RPO Nos. 34, 35, 38, 42, and 47 seek certain personnel files maintained by Plaintiffs
and documentation generally regarding certain employees' pay and bonus structure and compensation.
Defendants have narrowed their requests to seek only those portions of the subject personnel files
discussing "reprimands and accolades". The Court finds the foregoing requests are reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to Defendants' claims and, specifically, their
theory that Plaintiffs' agents were sent to Defendants' stores to obtain Defendants' trade secret
information. The Court further finds the requests, as limited by Defendants, are narrowly tailored,
reasonable in scope, and discoverable. See DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 377,
370 S.E.2d 194, 195-96 (1988); Contino v. Winn-Dixie Stores. Inc., No. CV214-146, 2015 WL 2226229,
at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 12, 2015). Thus, Defendants' request to compel a response to RPO Nos. 34, 35, 38,
42, and 47 is GRANTED as limited in Defendants' letter briefing.
32

C. Issues related to Plaintiffs' discovery requests raised in letter briefs"

(1) Documents related to communications with third-parties
Plaintiffs seek discovery related to communications with third parties and whistleblowers
regarding the alleged conduct at issue in this case, including communications between anonymous
whistleblower Humble Veritas, who forwarded to Plaintiffs email correspondence exchanged with
TitleMax's Director of Human Resources regarding the use of OMV databases to located and solicit
competitors' customers (Plaintiffs' Third Requests for Production ("Third RPD"), Nos. 1-4, 42, 43).
Defendants initially objected on the basis the requested discovery is in regards to claims being pursued in
separate Texas litigation. Defendants subsequently supplemented their discovery responses, agreeing to
produce the "whistleblower" documents produced in the Texas litigation, and assert the supplemental
discovery moots Plaintiffs' request to compel further production.
Defendants' production of certain "whistleblower" documents that were produced in the Texas
litigation and assertion Defendants are not aware of any other "whistleblowers" other than the one
identified in the Texas litigation does not squarely address Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Defendants
should supplement their response to produce any responsive, non-privileged documents and
communications in their possession or control.
(2) Personnelfiles
Plaintiffs seek documents from the personnel files of certain employees of Defendants involved
in the conduct at issue in this litigation (Third RPD No. 5) and contend they have narrowed their request
to seek documents from only the personnel files that relate to the parties' allegations in this action.
Plaintiffs contend each of the individuals included in this request were directly involved in the conduct at
issue. Defendants assert they have already agreed to search and produce 40 personnel files but Plaintiffs
now seek the personnel files of an additional 51 individuals who according to Defendants "have, at best,
attenuated connections to any issue in the case."
42

Although the Court's rulings in Part IV(A), supra, on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel relate to some of the
same categories of information and/or documents as addressed here, this section relates to discovery disputes
regarding Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories, Third RPD, Fourth RPD, and First Requests for Admissions ("RF A").
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Generally, employee personnel files are discoverable under Georgia law. See DeLoitte Haskins &

Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 377, 370 S.E.2d 194, 195-96 (1988); Contino v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., No. CV214-146, 2015 WL 2226229, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 12, 2015). Based on the information
provided, the Court cannot determine these individuals' involvement or relation to the conduct at issue in
this litigation. Whether the requested information is discoverable as reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims will likely depend on whether the
individuals have some involvement to the claims or conduct alleged or if, as Defendants allege, they have
had no material connection to the matters at issue. In light of the Courts' other rulings and instructions
herein, counsel are directed to meet and confer in good faith regarding this discovery request and the
remaining personnel files at issue. If an agreement cannot be reached as to which individuals' personnel
files are relevant to this litigation, the parties are free to file an appropriate motion which identifies the
relevant individuals and addresses their involvement/lack of involvement with this case.
(3) Telephone related records
Plaintiffs seek documents and phone records relating to telephones used by Defendants' stores
and their employees (specifically the employees identified in response to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 17)
who have solicited certain specifically named customers of the Plaintiffs (Third RPO Nos. 7 and 8).
Plaintiffs assert this request should be "straightforward" as Defendants have only identified one employee
in response to Interrogatory No. 17. Plaintiffs also seek phone records for Defendants' stores located
within 10 miles of certain cities where Plaintiffs allege their customers have been solicited by Defendants
(Third RPO No. 9). Upon Defendants' objection that the proposed geographic scope of the request was
too vague and ambiguous, Plaintiffs agreed to limit their request to a specific time frame for stores located
in certain zip codes.
Defendants assert they have agreed to produce the requested documents responsive to RPO Nos.
7-9, thus, mooting Plaintiffs' request to compel further production. However, Plaintiffs dispute that
Defendants have complied with their discovery obligations, insofar as they have only agreed to provide
certain records already in their files and only agreed to provide responsive information for the employee
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identified in response to Interrogatory No. 17, Taylor McMonigal, during a time period arbitrarily set by
Defendants which does not correspond to her period of employment and have not agreed to provide
records for mobile phones that she used while employed by them.
Irrespective of what may be physically in Defendants' "files", to the extent Defendants have
reasonable access to or can through reasonable efforts obtain records in response to Plaintiffs' RPD Nos.
7-9, they are required to do so. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-34(a) ("Any party may serve on any other party

a request: (1) To produce ... any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of
subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-26 and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party
upon whom the request is served"). See also Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc., 332 Ga. App. at 826.
Further, Defendants do not appear to have articulated a basis for only providing responsive documents
and phone records relating to telephones used by Taylor McMonigal during a limited time period or why
they cannot provide records regarding mobile phones she used.
The Court finds the requested discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Thus, the request to compel responses to Third RPD Nos. 7-9 is GRAN TED.
(4) Documents related to buy-outs
Plaintiffs seek information and documents regarding loans Defendants bought out from Plaintiffs
or originated after soliciting Plaintiffs' customers (Interrogatories 12 and 14; Third RPD Nos. 10, 11, and
44) and narrowed the request temporally to Nov. 7, 2009 through the present. Defendants have objected
on the basis that they do not centrally track buyouts and, as a result, the requested documents either do not
exist or are not reasonably accessible. Defendants assert until recently they did not centrally maintain
records of loans originated as buyouts or refinances of existing loans and, while it is possible some
individual stores may informally track this information, Defendants cannot determine which stores do so
or collect any such records, if they exist, without unreasonable burden, expense and the disruption of its
business.
As proposed by Defendants, they are directed to search for and produce information and
documents regarding the buyout of any of Plaintiffs' customers where the buyout was generated by
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conduct which Plaintiffs in this action contend was unlawful. Additionally, in line with the Court's ruling
in Part IV(B)(2), supra, with respect to Defendants' requests for Plaintiffs' buyout documentation, to the

extent Defendants in the regular course of business maintain any such documentation tracking buyouts of
Plaintiffs' customers' loans, same must be produced and provided to Plaintiffs.
(5) DMV records
Plaintiffs seek documents related to Defendants "use of DMV Records" and Defendants
"knowledge of, and/or compliance or non-compliance with, any state or federal law relating to the use of
DMV Records, including, but not limited to, the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act" (Third RPD Nos. 15
and 16). Plaintiffs offered to limit the request temporally to the time period of Nov. 9, 2009 to the present.
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' responses are deficient and although Defendants have agreed
to produce their "policies on DMV record searching, and non-privileged communications reiterating those
policies ... from July 1, 2013", such is not responsive to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Defendants object
on the basis the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome, asserting that, insofar as Plaintiffs
failed to define "DMV Records" and, for example, vehicle titles constitute DMV records,43 Plaintiffs'
requests would encompass "virtually every document involved in a title or transaction."
With respect to RPD Nos. 15 and 16, the Court finds the requests encompass relevant and
discoverable information and documents. However, the Court agrees the requests are overly broad given
Plaintiffs' failure to narrowly define the term "DMV Records". Counsel are directed to meet and confer in
good faith regarding an appropriate definition for the term narrowly tailored to the claims at issue and
thereafter Defendants should supplement their responses accordingly. If the parties are unable to reach an
agreement on a workable definition, each side should provide a proposed definition narrowly tailored to
the claims at issue.
Additionally, Plaintiffs ask Defendants to identify efforts taken to investigate "DMV Searching"
by employees, including efforts taken to determine which employees engaged in DMV Searching, what
43

See, e.g., I 8 U.S.C. §2721 (for purposes of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, defining "motor vehicle
record" to mean "any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle
registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicle").
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databases were used, the identities of individuals who were contacted using information obtained from
DMV Searching, and persons with knowledge of such efforts (Interrogatory No. 19).
Defendants' response that they "are presently unaware of any of their current or former
employees who have engaged in DMV Searching outside of the individuals already identified in the
Texas Action" and that they "with the assistance, advice and direction of legal counsel, investigated
Plaintiffs' allegations of DMV Searching and found no support for the allegations outside of Texas" does
not actually respond to the interrogatory posed. Although Defendants have asserted this discovery request
seeks privileged information, the Court agrees Defendants should be able provide some information
regarding efforts taken to investigate DMV Searching by employees without revealing privileged
comm uni cations or work product. Defendants are directed to supplement their response accordingly with
non-privileged, responsive information.

(6) Documents regarding Defendants' investigations into marketing at Plaintiffs' premises
Plaintiffs seek documents relating to efforts taken by Defendants to investigate their employees'
marketing at Plaintiffs' stores and/or parking lots (Third RPD No. 39). Defendants initially agreed to
produce responsive documents relating to investigations after this Court's May 28, 2015 Interlocutory
Injunction Order. However, Defendants have since agreed to produce any non-privileged documents
relating to pre-injunction investigations responsive to this request, thus, rendering Plaintiffs' request to
compel further production moot.
(7) Non-expert information regarding Defendants' damages

Plaintiffs seek "non-expert" information relating to damages Defendants allege to have suffered
as a result of Plaintiffs' use of the word "loan" in connection with their advertising in Georgia
(Interrogatory No. 21; Third RPD No. 41). Defendants object, asserting the requests are premature given
ongoing discovery and notes the Court has previously refused to compel discovery related to damages on
that basis and instead has instructed Defendants to supplement their responses at the conclusion of
discovery. Insofar as discovery is ongoing which may yield information regarding the extent of Plaintiffs'
practices relevant to these requests, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request to compel a response to
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Interrogatory No. 21 and Third RP D No. 41.However, Defendants are directed to supplement their
responses to these discovery requests upon the conclusion of discovery.

(8) Documents regarding disciplinary efforts
Plaintiffs assert Defendants have provided "incomplete, evasive responses" to their discovery
requests seeking documents and communications related to disciplinary efforts contemplated or
implemented by Defendants regarding: Defendants' and its affiliates' employees for engaging in the
misconduct alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint and the Court's Interlocutory Injunction; and employees'
failure to comply with Defendants' "policies prohibiting marketing to Plaintiffs" and with Defendants'
"supplemental initiatives to ensure that its employees comply with the[] policies" as referenced in
counsel's correspondence dated May 25, 2017 (Fourth RPD Nos. 1-4). Defendants initially only agreed to
produce documents regarding disciplinary actions with respect to employees of the currently named
Defendants and one affiliate, InstaLoan, (but not other affiliates) for violations of "Defendants' company
policies as they pertain to Plaintiffs." In a supplemental response Defendants have agreed to amend their
responses to include TitleMax's other non-party affiliates. However, Plaintiffs urge the responses remain
deficient insofar as they are limited to violations of company policy and ignore the remainder of
Plaintiffs' discover requests.
The Court finds the requested discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-1 l-26(b)(l), 9-11-34(a). See also
Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc., 332 Ga. App. at 826. Defendants are directed to supplement their
responses accordingly with non-privileged, responsive information.
(9) Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions
Plaintiffs contend Defendants' responses to their Request for Admissions ("RFA") Nos. 1-25 are
evasive and deficient insofar as Defendants have objected to providing information regarding entities that
are not a party to this litigation and excluded actions by employees of their wholly owned subsidiaries. In
a supplemental response Defendants' have agreed to amend their responses to include TitleMax's nonparty affiliates. Plaintiffs acknowledge the supplemental response moots their request to compel regarding
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RFA Nos. 16-25 but urge Defendants' responses remain deficient as to RFA Nos. 1-15, which seek
information concerning Defendants' alleged use of OMV records to identify and solicit Plaintiffs'
customers.
O.C.G.A. §9-11-36 governs requests for admissions. That Code Section provides in part:
(a) Scope; service; answer or objection; motion to determine sufficiency.
( 1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission, ... of the truth of any matters within the scope of subsection (b) of
Code Section 9-11-26 which are set forth in the request and that relate to
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the
genuineness of any documents described in the request. ...

(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set
forth ... The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the
reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A
denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission; and, when
good faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the
matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give
lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny
unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the
information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him
to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone,
object to the request; he may, subject to subsection (c) of Code Section 9-11-37,
deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
Here, Defendants' partial denials as to RFA Nos. 1-15 (denying only that their employees or their
affiliates' employees outside of Texas have conducted OMV searching) fail to comply with the
requirements of O.C.G.A. §9-11-36 insofar as they do not "specify so much of [the admission] as is true
and qualify or deny the remainder." Defendants are directed to supplement their responses accordingly to
comply with O.C.G.A. §9-11-36.
D. Defendants' request that Plaintiffs supplement their privilege log
Defendants objected to Plaintiffs' privilege log, asserting it fails to provide the information
necessary for Defendants to assess Plaintiffs' assertion of privilege. Specifically, Defendant cite: the
failure to include the email addresses of the author, recipient, and carbon-copy recipients of each
document; the failure to include the "subject line" of emails; the assertion of the attorney-client privilege
and work produce doctrine as to each item listed on the log which is 83 pages in length and includes
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2,624 documents; and Plaintiffs' failure to define a field/column heading included in the log (i.e. "DOC.

GROUP BEGIN and DOC. GROUP END"). However, it appears Plaintiffs have amended their privilege
log to address the issues raised by Defendants. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants' request that
Plaintiffs be deemed to have waived their privilege claims with respect to the documents identified in
their privilege log.
E. Defendants' request for additional interrogatories
Defendants ask to be permitted an additional twenty-five (25) interrogatories beyond the fifty
(50) allowed under the Civil Practice Act. O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-33(a)(l) generally limits the number of
interrogatories a party may serve to fifty (50) interrogatories, including subparts. However, parties may
with leave of court serve additional interrogatories upon a showing of, inter alia, complex litigation. Id.
Here, given the number of parties and complexity of the claims asserted, the Court grants leave for the
parties to serve an additional fifteen (15) interrogatories.
F. Discovery related deadlines
With the exception of the discovery requests regarding which the Court above has instructed the
parties through their respective Counsel to meet and confer, any supplementation of discovery responses
ordered herein should be provided to the opposing party within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order.44
Further, in light of the Court's rulings herein, at the meet and confer conference ordered above
Counsel are directed to also confer regarding case management deadlines and present a proposed
amended case management order with deadlines that shall govern final adjudication of this action.
V.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PARAGRAPHS l(a) AND l(b)
OF THE INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
On May 28, 2015, this Court entered a nationwide Interlocutory Injunction, enjoining Defendants

from engaging in the following acts: (l)(a) searching state DMV records for the purpose of obtaining the
identities and/or contact information of past or present customers of certain title loan stores operated by
Plaintiffs and their affiliates for any purpose not allowed by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
44

The parties may stipulate to extend this time in light of the number of documents to be produced but must
so notify the Court.
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("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq.; (l)(b) using any information obtained from the OMV records to

solicit Plaintiffs' customers; and (l)(c) entering Plaintiffs' stores or parking lots of their stores and
(i) collecting or recording Plaintiffs' customers' license plate or vehicle identification numbers for any
purposes not permitted by the DPPA, (ii) soliciting Plaintiffs' customers on Plaintiffs' premises, and
(iii) offering money or compensation of any sort to employees of Plaintiffs' stores for referring any
persons to do business with Defendants.
On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. With respect to the portion of the
injunction predicated on the trespass claim, the Court held: "To the extent that the nationwide injunction
limits the circumstances in which TitleMax may go upon property from which Drummond has no right to
exclude TitleMax agents and employees, the scope of the injunction is not warranted by a claim for
trespass ... " TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 838, 797 S.E.2d 842,
845 (2017).
Regarding the portion of the injunction based on Plaintiffs' claim asserting a misappropriation of
trade secrets under Georgia law, the Court held: "[T]o the extent that the nationwide injunction against
TitleMax collecting information about Drummond customers in parking lots or using that information to
search databases of motor vehicles is based on a finding that the identities of Drummond customers are
trade secrets, the injunction cannot be sustained ... " Id. at 838-839.
Finally, with regard to the portion of the injunction based on the claim for tortious interference
with contracts and business relationships which prohibited TitleMax from offering compensation to
Drummond employees who refer Drummond customers to TitleMax, the Court found no abuse of
discretion in enjoining such conduct nationally. The Supreme Court concluded its opinion as follows:
To the extent that the nationwide injunction prohibits TitleMax employees and
agents from going into Drummond stores for certain purposes, and to the extent
that it prohibits TitleMax from offering compensation to Drummond employees
for customer referrals, the injunction is affirmed. To the extent that the
injunction prohibits TitleMax from going upon parking lots near
Drummond stores for certain purposes or from searching government
databases of motor vehicles, however, it must be reconsidered. Those aspects
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of the injunction appear most obviously to have been based on the claims for
trespass and misappropriation of trade secrets, but the laws of trespass and trade
secrets (at least in Georgia) do not support the scope of the injunction.

Accordingly, we vacate the injunction in those respects, and we remand for
the trial court to reconsider the scope of its injunction. To the extent that the
parties on remand may rely on law that varies significantly from state to state, we
remind that activities in one state are not due to be enjoined simply because
they might be unlawful if done in another state.
Id. at 839-40 (emphasis added).
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reinstate Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) of the
nationwide Interlocutory Injunction (collectively the "DMV Search and Solicitation Conduct"), because
even if Defendants' conduct does not constitute a misappropriation of trade secrets under Georgia law, the
DMV Search and Solicitation Conduct still constitutes: (1) tortious interference with contract and
business relationships as alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint; and (2) a misappropriation of trade secrets under
the laws of the other named States other than Georgia.
A. Standard
In deciding whether to issue an interlocutory injunction, the trial court should
consider whether: (1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened injury to the
moving party outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may do to the
party being enjoined; (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party
will prevail on the merits of her claims at trial; and (4) granting the interlocutory
injunction will not disserve the public interest. Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. at 604,
706 S.E.2d 634.7 Although an interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, and the power to grant it must be" 'prudently and cautiously exercised,'
" the trial court is vested with broad discretion in making that decision. Id. at 604,
706 S.E.2d 634 (citation omitted).
SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5, 709 S.E.2d 267,271 (2011). See also
Parker v. Clary Lakes Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 272 Ga. 44, 44, 526 S.E.2d 838, 839 (2000) ("A trial court
may issue an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo until the final hearing if, by balancing the
relative equities of the parties, it would appear that the equities favor the party seeking the injunction.
Thus, a demonstration of irreparable injury is not an absolute prerequisite to interlocutory injunctive
relief'); City of Waycross v. Pierce Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, 300 Ga. I 09, 111, 793 S.E.2d 389, 392
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(2016) ("Because the test for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction is a balancing test, it [i]s not
incum bent upon the [moving party] to prove all four factors to obtain the interlocutory injunction").

B. Tortious interference with contract and business relationships
Plaintiffs argue this Court already found Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their
tortious interference claims, and on interlocutory appeal the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion
in the Court's Interlocutory Injunction premised thereon. Given this, Plaintiffs contend the tortious
interference claim affords an alternate ground supporting reinstatement of the injunction of the DMV
Search and Solicitation Conduct. However, the appellate court actually found no abuse of discretion in the
portions of the Interlocutory Injunction: that prohibited Defendants from offering compensation to
Plaintiffs' employees for customer referrals, which the appellate court stated appeared to be based on the
tortious interference claims"; and that prohibited Defendants' employees and agents from going into
Plaintiffs' stores for "certain purposes", which was another aspect of Plaintiffs' tortious interference
claims as alleged in their complaint". The Supreme Court did not address the DMV Search and
Solicitation Conduct in the context of Plaintiffs' tortious interference claims.
Further, as held in Part l(B)(2), supra, Count III (tortious interference with Plaintiffs' prospective
CSO contracts and business relationships) is preempted entirely by Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims and the
portion of Count IV (tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective CSO contracts
and business relationships) that relates to the alleged misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets
(i.e., searching DMV records to obtain Plaintiffs' trade secret customer information to then solicit
Plaintiffs' customers) is also preempted. The surviving portions of the tortious interference claim based
on Defendants' improper solicitation of Plaintiffs' customers and employees on Plaintiffs' premises
(which are in part the basis for other aspects of the Interlocutory Injunction which were upheld) provides
no basis for the reinstatement of the portions of the Interlocutory Injunction addressing the DMV Search
and Solicitation Conduct.

45
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FAC, 1127.
FAC, ,[126.
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C. Misappropriation of trade secrets under the TSA of states other than Georgia

As held in Part I(B)(l), Plaintiffs' trade secret misappropriation claims, which are construed
under the laws of the state where such misappropriation is alleged to have occurred, survive the pleadings
stage with the exception of the claim as asserted under Georgia law. As noted above, in Plaintiffs'
pleadings and briefings the trade secrets claims and related allegations regarding the OMV Search and
Solicitation Conduct focus on such conduct as is alleged to have occurred in Ohio and New Mexico.47
Having balanced the relative equities of the parties, the Court finds the equities weigh in favor of
Plaintiffs and the reinstatement of the Interlocutory Injunction with respect to the OMV Search and
Solicitation Conduct but only in Ohio and New Mexico. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that they
safeguard their customers' information (including names, contact information, and lien information), that
this information is not readily available to the public and that Plaintiffs derive economic value from the
compiled information not being readily ascertainable through proper means by others, and that in Ohio
and New Mexico Defendants are likely improperly accessing OMV record information in order to directly
solicit Plaintiffs' customers.
The Court further finds there is a substantial threat that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if
the injunction is not granted with respect to the OMV Search and Solicitation Conduct in the loss of, inter
alia, long-time customers and goodwill. Also, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighs any threatened
harm that the injunction may do to Defendants, particularly given that Defendants cannot assert any right
to do that which is unlawful or any harm from following the law regarding the proper use of OMV record
information. Further, reinstating the injunction as to the OMV Search and Solicitation Conduct will not
disserve the public interest, but rather serves the public interest in protecting consumers' private
information and ensuring state and federal laws governing the use of OMV record information are
followed.

47

See FAC, ,i,i68, 90-92; Plaintiffs' Motion for Interlocutory Injunction and for Litigation Expenses, pp. 2324, 29-31; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11, 13-18 and nn. 9, 10, 15,
16; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, p.8.
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Although Plaintiffs urge the injunction regarding the OMV Search and Solicitation Conduct
should be reinstated nationwide, as noted by the Supreme Court:
[I]f Drumm ond has shown only that TitleMax may have misappropriated trade
secrets in one or two states by improperly gathering information in those states
about customers in those states, we fail to see how that showing would sustain
a nationwide injunction against TitleMax gathering customer information,

including in states in which its practices may not violate the law of trade secrets
in any respect (like Georgia).
TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., 300 Ga. at 839 n. 8 (emphasis in original).
Here, evidence has been presented regarding Defendants' alleged OMV Search and Solicitation
Conduct in Ohio and New Mexico.48 Although Plaintiffs allege "upon information and belief' that such
conduct is taking place elsewhere and is actionable, that is an insufficient showing to warrant a
nationwide injunction. Id. Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement of Paragraphs l(a)
and l(b) of the Interlocutory Injunction is GRANTED IN PART and Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) are hereby
reinstated but only to the extent of enjoining Defendants from engaging in the activities described
thereunder in Ohio and New Mexico.
VI.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS

SEPARATE

TRIAL

ON

DEFENDANTS'

In the instant motion Plaintiffs' ask the Court to order that Defendants' counterclaims be tried
separately from Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-13(b). That Code Section provides in
relevant part: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. But any such
permissive counterclaim shall be separated for the purposes of trial, unless the parties otherwise agree."
Having considered the record, the Court will reserve ruling on this motion pending completion of
discovery, resolution of any dispositive motions and until closer to trial.

48

Excluding Texas and South Carolina.
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SO ORD ERE D this q ay of March, 2018.

o Atlanta Business Case Division
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Served upon registered service contacts via eFileGA:

Attorney for Plaintiffs
Joseph D. Wargo
Dustin S. Sharpes
Arthur D. Brannan
WARGO & FRENCH, LLP
999 Peachtree Street N.E.
26th Floor
Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 853-1500
Facsimile: (404) 853-1501
jwargo@wargofrench.com
dsharpes@wargofrench.com

Attorneys for Defendants
Eric A. Larson
Simon R. Malko
MORRIS, MANNING & MARTIN, LLP
3343 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30326
Telephone: (404) 233-7000
Facsimile: (404) 365-9532
elarson@mmmlaw.com
smalko@mmmlaw.com

John C. Matthews (admitted PHV)
WARGO & FRENCH LLP
201 S. Biscayne Blvd
Suite 1000
Miami, FL 33131
Tel: 305-777-6075
j matthews@wargofrench.com

46

